Southern Illinois University Carbondale

OpenSIUC
Working Papers

Political Networks Paper Archive

10-15-2010

The Effect of Network Structure on the Provision
of Security
Annelies Z. Kamran
CUNY Graduate School and University Center, akamran@gc.cuny.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pn_wp
Paper to be presented at ISSS/ISAC Conference October 15, 2010 Providence, Rhode Island Draft:
comments welcome
Recommended Citation
Kamran, Annelies Z., "The Effect of Network Structure on the Provision of Security" (2010). Working Papers. Paper 53.
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pn_wp/53

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Networks Paper Archive at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Working Papers by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.

The Effect of Network Structure on the Provision of Security
Paper to be presented at ISSS/ISAC Conference
October 15, 2010 Providence, Rhode Island
Draft: comments welcome

Annelies Z. Kamran
Political Science
The Graduate Center
The City University of New York
365 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10016
akamran@gc.cuny.edu

Abstract:
The term “security” has many more dimensions in the post-9/11 world than it had during
the Cold War. Threats may come from different sources, at different speeds, and have
different targets. All the actors involved in the provision of security from a specific type
of threat create a network—not just states or states in intergovernmental organizations,
but all the actors in the “ecosystem." If we look at the relationships among these actors
using network analysis, we should be able to map the structure of the entire network.
Contrary to the assumptions in most International Relations literature, networks can be
centralized (as in hierarchical states) or not, as in markets. The networks transnational
actors have created to meet different threats exhibit different structures, from dense and
highly centralized to diffuse and dispersed. The network’s structure may thus have a
positive or negative effect on the provision of security, depending on the type of threat
that is to be met.

The Jeweled Net of Indra
Driving down the freeway, remembering Hindu mythology—
Indra’s net, each intersecting weave holding a jewel
reflecting every other facet of every other jewel, infinitely.
Suddenly, I see the hands that paint the white lines,
that lay the black asphalt, hands of a man joyous or lost
soap-scrubbing his body clean for dinner and beer,
for the wife who loves him, hands that hold their tickets
for London to see the grandmother, the hard-drinking
pub matron whose body bore children in building rubble
when the Nazi bombing relented—and if not for that war,
would I be driving now, hands on the wheel, listening
to the radio recount the birth of the child named Tsunami
after the storm that drove her mother into the hills,
would the meager dollars I send to rebuild a village—
minted with the Rosicrucian-eye above the pyramid
dreamed by this country’s founders as the all-seeing
vision of a world where not a sparrow falls
that we don’t know about—would I have known
to send it, if not for the hands that flew the kite
that drew electricity from the skies that made its way
into the flat-screened box that unveils this jewel-linked world
twenty-four hours of every gleaming day, weaving news
with advertisements for clothes made by hands in China
nimbly sewing a dream of Hollywood and Ipod and offering
their bodies one by one for a better future—
while the coal that fumes the electricity that plunges
the needle drifts in air that circles a globe that warms
the icecaps that melt into sea that shifts the current
that loves the wind that swirls from heaven to earth
stirring one storm after another, blowing
its diaphanous passion over New Orleans like a trumpet
sinking the heart so low with blue notes that flood
is a dark cure for what burns—this illusion
that anyone stands alone—stranded
on the roofs of our swollen houses mouthing
save me to a world whose millions of hands
can turn up the volume loud enough to finally hear,
or flick with a single click the entire interconnected
vision of it all off.
—Dane Cervine (2007)
What do a slice of Swiss cheese, a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scan, and
global governance have in common? The familiar cheese is a structure whose taste
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remains unchanged but whose visual appearance changes by slicing in different
directions—depending on the cut, the same holes appear different. An MRI takes finely
detailed pictures of such heterogeneous structures as the human brain. Tiny twodimensional slices are assembled to provide an extremely accurate three-dimensional
depiction of complex reality, but any one slice provides only a partial picture that is
accurate but can be misleading. The concept of global governance provides a description
of the complex, heterogeneous structures of the connections and interactions in world
politics, which can be studied by examining slices at different geographical, temporal,
and issue junctures. At present, social scientists have knives to slice cheese but are
grasping for tools to take MRI slides.
In ameliorating global governance theorizing, this paper examines first definitions
of global governance and then the use of social network analysis to map the transactions
between multiple actors—the most promising way to appreciate the partial and currently
available slices of contemporary international relations. It continues with empirical
examples of global security governance: international responses to the Indian Ocean
tsunami of December 2004 and nuclear proliferation. It ends with a description of
network strategies for governance and suggestions for a future research agenda.
Global Governance
Definitions
Global governance is too new a notion to be defined in many political science
lexicons, or even in the Oxford English Dictionary’s online edition. However, in its
inaugural edition in 1995, the journal Global Governance contained definitional attempts
by James N. Rosenau and Lawrence S. Finkelstein.
Rosenau, building on his life’s work, writes that governance is concerned with the
mechanisms of control (both trans-national and sub-national practices and institutions)
that are essentially related to one another, and when taken together constitute systems of
rule. He emphasizes the exponential growth of interdependence as actors proliferate to
meet the new needs that are created. The existing world order remains without
overarching authority, which does not mean that there is no structure: “Governance
encompasses the activities of governments, but it also includes the many other channels
through which ‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and
policies pursued” (Rosenau 1995:14). There is no global ordering principle, but global
governance is usefully seen as the sum of the formal and informal mechanisms that
ensure partial ordering—what Rosenau poetically calls a “crazy quilt.”
Finkelstein wrote that “global” denotes a world in which actors other than states
play an increasingly important role, and in which decision-making processes are
multilevel, connected both within and between states. “Governance” is an ambiguous
term that refers to governing without government, the title of Rosenau and Ernst
Czempiel’s earlier set of influential essays (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). “Global
governance,” for Finkelstein, is “any purposeful activity intended to ‘control’ or
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influence someone else that either occurs in the arena occupied by nations or, occurring
at other levels, projects influence into that arena.” It is a process of activity, and to
differentiate it from other terms, its descriptive rather than normative nature should be
emphasized: “global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships
that transcend national frontiers” (Finkelstein 1995:368-9).
More recently, Anne Mette Kjaer examined the term “governance” and its usage
in different fields of political science including comparative politics, international
relations, and public administration policy. She found that most definitions refer to
something broader than government alone: to the “steering” and rules of the game as well
as to institutions and institutional change. Increasing use of the same term among fields,
in her opinion, reflects the erosion of boundaries. All versions address the importance of
networks, of reciprocity, accountability, and democracy.
However, different fields are addressing different problems, and the views of
global governance held in international relations vary strongly depending on whether or
not contemporary globalization is seen as a transformation of economic, military,
environmental, and socio-cultural interactions. Theorists tend to fall in two camps: those
who believe states are the most important actors, and those who do not. Neo-realists and
pluralists (of the English school) believe that global governance is no more than what
states agree, while solidarists look to the collective action of states in defense of human
security as global governance. However, solidarists differ from neo-realists and pluralists
in believing that globalization has been transformative. Finally, liberalists believe that
not only are many global governance processes underway at subnational, national, and
supranational levels, but that the regimes thus created are likely to be flat nonhierarchical networks with no one actor in clear control. Thus, for them, global
governance refers to the totality of all regimes (Kjaer 2004).
“Global governance” does not denote good or bad practice but describes
cooperative problem-solving arrangements. They may be formal, taking the shape of laws
or institutions to manage collective affairs by such actors as state authorities, IGOs,
NGOs, private sector firms, other civil society actors, and individuals. But arrangements
may also involve such informal mechanisms as practices or guidelines or even temporary
units (e.g., coalitions). Global governance includes purpose-built regimes as well as
market-driven evolutions and adaptations.
This author agrees with Thakur and Weiss that global governance is “the complex
of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between
and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental,
through which collective interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and
obligations are established, and differences are mediated” (Thakur and Weiss 2010).
This definition emphasizes five components that are essential for analyzing contemporary
international relations: level of analysis (transnational); issues; non-state actors; the
dynamics of governance; and the interdependent yet loosely-coupled complex
international system.
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Structure and agency
Global governance is about understanding and creating structures through
repeated relationships, or patterns of authority. It is a heuristic device that allows us to
pay attention to a range of activities and actors in contemporary world politics. States
remain the most important actors, but a host of other actors are increasingly crucial; and
all of the actors in any case are interdependent. And interests are partly a result of an
actor’s attributes and identity, and partly of its structural role and position within the
extant world order.
Collectivities are organized to achieve goals, and they draw on different sources
of legitimacy. For example, a state is organized differently from a corporation, and for
different purposes. A state has sovereignty, which provides an interest in defending a
given territory. A corporation is organized to make a profit, which gives it an interest in
certain people (its market). Global governance thus recognizes that human beings create
many kinds of organizational structures that interact with one other and evolve
constantly.
This is structure as the Gramscian idea of historic bloc: the superstructures
formed by the unification of leaders and followers around a particular mode of
production, and the social relations it engenders (Joll 1977, Sassoon 1987, Gramsci and
Forgacs 1988). In international relations, the “product” may be a process such as war, or
it may be a service like humanitarian aid. Hegemony, then, is the point where the ideas
that govern that product meets the class of actors that both supports the ideas and is
supported by them.
In other words, the structural position of actors depends on the framing of an
issue, or how it is categorized by actors that are paying attention to it. A state active in
peace and security may not be as engaged on environmental issues, or the other way
around—for example, Israel is active in security issues, but is not known for its stand on
the environment, while Japan’s involvement in security is not as well known as its
activity in environmental issues. Or an NGO can have tremendous impact on rule-making
but not on enforcement or the other way around—for instance, the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines’s lobbying led to a multilateral treaty, while Amnesty
International’s reporting and shaming have been effective at protecting human rights.
This framing of global governance allows us to pursue a constructivist research
agenda that fits Jeffrey T. Checkel’s criteria for building “middle-range theory,” or
efforts to link theory to reality. In essence, it consists of making one’s ontology consistent
with one’s epistemology, and vice versa. Checkel seeks a constructivist theory that can
test reality in comparison and in contradiction to theory; compare among cases; be used
to study socially constructed outcomes that are negative and not just positive; and
formulate standardized definitions (Checkel 1998).
Other schools of thought
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Realists study state vs. state behavior. Liberal institutionalists scrutinize state
interactions with international institutions. Rather than placing constructivism in
opposition to either, it is best viewed at the other end of a spectrum. The lessons from
realism and liberal institutionalism are pertinent to explain actor behavior, but they are
misleading or insufficient to understand the ever-changing behavior of the international
system as a whole, and unexpected outcomes. That requires the sum of all such
relationships.
Returning to Checkel’s criteria, we need to look at multiple slices of global
governance, investigating simultaneously as many different types of ties between and
among actors as possible. We also need to examine the ties (or lack thereof) between
different types of actors, and to study entire networks. To that end, I propose to look at
how actors do or do not interact in global governance.
Not all MRI-like slices provide the same picture of the evolution in international
society because the patterns of relationships and institutions vary by issue, geographic
location, and historical period. For instance, calculations about international peace and
security are not the same for major and minor powers, not similar for nuclear weapons
and drugs, and not comparable before and after 9/11.
Global governance is often conducted by different types of actors, depending on
an issue—for instance for international security, members of the US’s 82nd Airborne
Division (national armed forces) or UN peacekeepers (international armed forces). At the
same time, actors that are a priori viewed as distinct may actually play similar roles—for
example, soldiers or Oxfam personnel in a war zone may both be caring for or protecting
refugees.
Using Social Network Analysis to Study Global Governance
An ecological approach looks at the entire system of interactions, both among
actors and between actors and environment. Global governance fits the definition of a
complex system: multiple types of actors and processes, the structure of which is the
result of past structure, actor choices, and stochastic processes. The modelling of such
complex systems in international relations has its roots in sociology and English School
international relations theory. It is greatly facilitated by the use of quantitative social
network analysis methods, used to map broad trends and patterns, which can then be used
as a basis for comparison, for finding “communities” of similar actors, and for
investigations into dynamics. To demonstrate this, examples from a range of global
security governance issues will be explored.
However, using social network analysis to study global governance requires
careful examination of both ontology and epistemology, as the definitions and
conceptions of what is to be studied are affected by the choice of a formal mathematical
approach. In contrast to both realism and liberal institutionalism, which look at the
pattern of interaction among the members of only one or two types of organization, the
ecological approach assumes that all the organizations that demonstrate agency, or
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choice, count as actors. These actors interact with each other and with their environment,
which refers not just to the strictly material or ideal, but also to background trends such
as globalization that do not exhibit agency. In this sense, it draws upon the heritage of
English School theory (Bull 1977, Buzan 2004, Devlen et al. 2005, Hurrell 2007). This
approach also means that the intellectual puzzles of researchers will change, as the
questions become more oriented toward patterns of cooperation and cohesion, and less
about the actions and motivations of individual actors, or of specific types of actors.
Slices of political space
A graphic representation of political space would show the multiple dimensions in
which issues can be mapped. The dimensions to be mapped may vary, but as an
example, security could be mapped by asking these questions: “Where does the threat
come from?” “What is the target of the threat?” “How fast does the threat move?” and
“What is the severity of the threat?” These are spectra, or continuums, not dichotomous
categories, and thus can be imagined as dimensional axes. Patterns of cooperation, or
networks among actors, are different depending on where one looks on these dimensions.
An advantage of mapping along multiple dimensions is that no one position can
be seen as a priori privileged. It also means that the space can be “questioned” by
different lines of thought. For example, one could ask where the organizations that deal
with the security of internally displaced persons (IDP) camps intersect with organizations
that deal with human rights or more specifically women’s rights. This would help
provide security to those most likely to face unique threats to their security while in the
camps, not just the threat that the camp itself provides security from.
Take slices of this space by imagining Swiss cheese or an MRI: one slice may be
a very misleading picture of the structure, but build up enough layers, and you start to get
a 3-D object. If the networks are the slices, more than one slice can be studied. Some of
these networks may have overlapping memberships, or intersections.
Fig. 1: Slices of security space

Capturing the complexity of the range of problems, actors, and partial solutions is a
benefit of using global governance as an analytical perspective in understanding
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international responses to events like the tsunami. But we are still at the Swiss cheeselevel of precision, groping for tools for a few MRI-level slides. What could get us closer?
Social network analysis (SNA) is one promising methodology because it allows
comparisons of the types of contours of structures and gaps that characterize international
reactions to global problems. It provides a way to systematically study the structural
properties of networks as well as the location and characteristics of actors within them; it
uses mathematical representation in order to quantify empirical data and to model
relations and structures and represent the results graphically. SNA allows the
simultaneous consideration of multiple relationships—a major insight for the analysis of
international relations, even when considering states let alone the multiple types of actors
and layers of relationships that characterize contemporary global governance. The
following section is meant as a basic introduction to the elements of SNA using
comparative security networks for those who are totally unfamiliar with SNA. For a
more thorough introduction, please see the article “Social network analysis: A
methodological introduction,” by Carter Butts (2008), or the texts by Scott (1991),
Wasserman and Faust (1994), or Knoke and Yang (2008).
The basic elements of SNA are actors, which are the social units, and relations,
which are the ties between or among actors that are channels for the flow of resources
(ties can be affiliations, as in members of the same club). There are three basic
assumptions underlying social network analysis. First, we are dealing with relationships
or connections and not merely static units. It is therefore not a method suited to studying
units in isolation. Second, SNA assumes that social units are interdependent; their ties
both enable and constrain actions. This also means that regular statistical methods have
limited utility because actors are not independent and cannot be analyzed in isolation one
from another. Third, SNA assumes that there are system-wide relational properties, and
that the sum of such “enduring patterns of relations” constitutes the system’s structure.
Network terms can be translated into international relations via the measures of
power in global governance described by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. They
divide types of power into a matrix with two core dimensions: the kinds of social
relations through which power works, and the specificity of the social relations through
which power’s effects are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005). The first kind of power,
familiar to realists, is compulsory power that represents direct control of one actor over
another. This can be measured in network terms in many ways: as a regulatory
relationship with one party making and enforcing rules, as a contractual relationship with
an exchange of goods or services for payment, or a conflictual relationship with one party
using violence against another.
Institutional power is more diffuse because actors exert control over others that
are socially distant. Membership in an alliance, attendance at UN conferences and other
types of affiliations are network relations that measure this type of power. Structural
power represents the capacities of actors—in other words, what they are depends on
where they are in the network. Finally, productive power is the production of subjects
through the diffuse social relations of discursive practices. To paraphrase, an actor’s
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“self” is a creation of discourse, or negotiation with and against multiple others. This can
be measured longitudinally by process tracing that links diffusion of norms and ideas to
actor constitution—that is, it is helpful to track the progress of an idea through the
network, and then look for evidence that the actors’ identities have changed as a result.
This paper explores network "slices" of the cloud of actors involved in the
governance of global security issues (for the purposes of demonstration, this paper looks
at networks from different issue areas, but the concept applies to geographical and
temporal slices as well). The networks I will be examining are two networks from a case
study of a human security threat—the Indian Ocean tsunami, and two networks from a
case study of a traditional security threat—the attempt to stem nuclear proliferation. This
paper then maps the institutional and compulsory power relations in both human security
(the tsunami) and traditional security (nuclear nonproliferation) networks.
The actors belong to different sets (because they are different types of
organizations—states, NGOs, companies, etc.), but there are also connections among and
between sets. On the basis of this theoretical framework, it should be possible to
examine both clustering, or how closely connected actors are, and structural equivalence,
or finding “communities” of actors with similar patterns of relations to the rest of the
network.
Slices of Global Governance: Traditional and Human Security Networks
Human security and traditional security are different but related hegemonic ideas
that engender different but related historic blocs. International peace and security—
whether the more expansive human security variety of protection against threats to
individuals, or the more traditional “bombs and bullets” one of protection for national
boundaries—has been viewed as the exclusive preserve of states (MacFarlane and FoongKhong 2006). Protecting public health normally also is viewed as a state responsibility,
and measures taken against the spread of disease have been among the most draconian
(Kraut 1994). The state has also been responsible for infrastructure and its failure—which
is why the Netherlands invested billions to hold back the North Sea and why the breach
of levees in New Orleans was viewed as a government failure.
Dangers resulting from public health and infrastructure failure thus are viewed as
threats to human security as well as to traditional sovereignty. The Indian Ocean tsunami
of 26 December 2004 demonstrates global action to meet a security threat that
transcended national borders. Analyzing it illustrates better the strengths and weaknesses
of global governance—in theory and in practice—than pointing to the obvious lack of
adequate political will or international military force to intervene in Darfur (Center for
International Cooperation 2007).
The response to the Indian Ocean tsunami provides a microcosm of global
governance and how a global problem is addressed in a decentralized world. The
responses by a constellation of relief organizations, national governments, militaries, and
private individuals around the world illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of global
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governance. An overall response network (states, IGOs, and NGOs) was in place, but the
creation of the tailored network for the tsunami required negotiating a structure among
existing groups as well as procedures to incorporate others that joined later.
The provision of emergency supplies to affected populations was available almost
immediately, reflecting a long-standing moral commitment to react quickly and
generously in the face of natural disasters. As people in the affected regions began
calling, texting, and uploading images and movies, massive relief began. In a natural
disaster, the acceptance of outside humanitarian action was virtually automatic, which is
not the case in wars because aid can be seen to be benefiting the enemy rather than the
common good. Humanitarianism can be traced from the major world religions through
Cicero, medieval philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, father of international law Hugo
Grotius, and liberal peace philosopher Immanuel Kant. As a codified modern
international institutionalized response, humanitarianism can be traced back to the Battle
of Solferino (1859), when Henri Dunant’s actions led to the formation of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, to his lobbying for Napoleon III to proclaim the rights of
the wounded, and to the 1864 Geneva Convention. Norm evolution since then has both
sought to constrain state actions and enable international succor for natural and many
human-made disasters (Weiss and Collins 2000). In the case of the tsunami, we have seen
that “competitive compassion” resulted in what many even saw as excess resources for
the tsunami victims.
In a human security frame, the network is more likely to be self-organized,
meaning the number of actors, as well as the type of actor involved could be increased,
allowing for an openness and transparency that could be met by communication among
the actors. In contrast, the organization of the actors in the networks that prevent nuclear
proliferation is for the most part, not self-organized, which has implications for its
effectiveness. This in turn allows accountability: progress, or lack thereof, could be
openly tracked through the media as in the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami (Telford and
Cosgrave 2006), or through nongovernmental organizations such as the World Nuclear
Association. A network that is more formally organized, by treaties and executive
agreements, may be more stable and permanent, but it is likely to be less open, and more
rigid in responding to new attempts at proliferation.
States in the nonproliferation network, by attempting to hold onto their de jure
authority, may be denying the network as a whole the flexibility and transparency it
needs to counter proliferation: “The relationships between the DPRK [North Korean] and
Khan networks show the shifting roles that ring members may play, with the DPRK
acting on different occasions as a buyer, seller, and supplier to mutual partners” (Braun
and Chyba 2004). Stopping or at least controlling proliferation is important; as Sagan
explained, more nuclear states will be worse for the world. Novice nuclear states lack
either adequate military or civilian political organizational controls, and therefore have a
higher risk of either deliberate or accidental nuclear war. Deterrence strategy took the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. years to work out; many new nuclear states seem completely unaware
of the depth of thinking necessary. Furthermore, deterrence may not work, because
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novice nuclear states’ capability may not survive to make a second-strike (Sagan and
Waltz 1995).
Network Measurements
All calculations were performed with Ucinet 6 and all images were created using
Netdraw (Borgatti, et al. 2002), unless otherwise noted. The compulsory power network
for the tsunami consisted of 2,107 records of financial transactions among 505 distinct
actors from the Financial Tracking Service database. These actors were states, IGOs,
NGOs, companies, academic institutions, municipalities, news media organizations, and
private individuals, with a reserve category of “unspecified” for those that could not be
traced via web search (Kamran 2009a). This network will be referred to as the
“transnational aid flows” network. The institutional power network for the tsunami
consisted of 2,504 records of cooperative interactions among 234 distinct actors culled
from OCHA’s situation reports, in the following categories: state, IGO, NGO, academic
institution, company, state-owned company, multiple (indicating an organization with
multiple types of actors acting as one), and private individual (Kamran 2009a). This
network will be referred to as the “OCHA sitreps” network.
The compulsory power network for nuclear nonproliferation consisted of 575
records of financial transactions among 454 distinct actors created from the Business
Source Premier (now called Business Source Complete) database maintained by EBSCO.
These actors were states, companies, state-owned corporations, joint action agencies
(joint-action agencies are owned by their members, which are electricity cooperatives),
partnerships, joint ventures, academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and unknown. Actors were coded as
state-owned if they were more than 50% owned by a state (Kamran 2009b). This
network will be referred to as the “nuclear contracts” network. The institutional power
network for nuclear nonproliferation consisted of 196 distinct actors related by twelve
treaties or agreements. These actors were all states as recognized by the United Nations,
with the exception of Taiwan, Republic of China (Kamran 2009b). This network will be
referred to as the “nuclear treaties” network. For more information on all these networks,
please refer to the sources.
The most commonly used measures to examine social networks are density,
centrality, cohesion, and durability. Density in a network is a measure indicating the total
of all existing ties divided by the number of ties possible in the network (with the value
of the ties being included in ordinal networks). Within and between block densities can
be calculated for data that are grouped. For example, data can be partitioned into
different types of organizations and examined for the density of information exchange
within and between types—a key measure of diffusion of ideas.
Box 1: Density
Frame
Human Security
Traditional Security

Relation
Compulsory power
Institutional power
Compulsory power

Network
transnational aid flows
OCHA sitreps
nuclear contracts
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Density
0.9
1.0
1.1

Institutional power

nuclear treaties

2.4

As is clear from Box 1, density is higher in traditional security networks than in
human security networks. This is likely a reflection of flexibility and ease of
making/breaking ties in human security networks. However, it also indicates that the
speed at which information diffuses among the actors is relatively quicker in the
traditional security networks, and the extent to which actors in those networks have levels
of social constraint is higher than in human security networks. Density is also higher in
the compulsory power relations than in the institutional power relations of both human
and traditional security networks, demonstrating that making ties in order to share
information and expertise (as well as enforcement) generally involves more than bilateral
ties—information diffusion is maximized when there are more actors in the network.
Centrality is a key indication of power, because it measures how information and
resources flow or fail to. “Closeness centrality” indicates the shortest paths to all other
actors, while “degree centrality” the number of direct connections an actor has. The best
way to understand these measurements are in-degrees and out-degrees, indicating actors
by the number of choices that they could make and the number of ties established by
them.
Box 2: Centrality
Frame
Human
Security

Traditional
Security

Relation
Compulsory
power

Network
transnational aid
flows

Closeness Centrality
(this measure is not
applicable in a
disconnected graph)

Institutional
power

OCHA sitreps

Compulsory
power

nuclear
contracts

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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UN
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
Thailand
US
Areva
Framatome ANP
Exelon Corp
Westinghouse
Electric Co
• US Department of
Energy

Degree Centrality
• Private
(individual
donations)
• United States
• United Kingdom
• EC
Humanitarian
Aid Office
• IFRC
• International
Organization for
Migration
• UN OCHA
• World Health
Organization
• UN
• Indonesia
• Sri Lanka
• Thailand
• US
• Westinghouse
Electric Co
• Chernobyl
Shelter Project
• US Department
of Energy
• Framatome ANP
• Areva

Institutional
power

nuclear treaties

•
•
•
•
•

Australia
New Zealand
Argentina
Austria
Belgium

•
•
•
•
•

Australia
New Zealand
Argentina
Austria
Belgium

Box 2 shows the actors in each network with the highest centrality scores. Degree
centrality for “transnational aid flows” is divided into outdegree (on top) for aid donors
and indegree (on bottom) for aid recipients. There can be important differences in which
actors are most central according to the measure used, which is why it is recommended to
look at more than one measure. One thing that becomes clear, however, is that nonstate
actors can be as or more important to the structure and functioning of the network than
state actors.
Cohesion measures sub-structures within networks, such as alliances or even
cliques. Cohesive subgroups have four general properties: mutuality of ties, closeness or
“reachability” of subgroup members, frequency of ties among members, and the relative
frequency of ties among subgroup members compared to non-members (Wasserman and
Faust 1994). The institutional power relation networks were more cohesive than the
compulsory power networks, even though in the human security frame the organizations
did not necessarily have ties prior to the event while in the traditional security frame the
cohesion was the result of long and painstaking multilateral treaty negotiation-. This
result has implications for effectiveness at responding to a security event: networks that
are not cohesive are less likely to communicate well, and should therefore be more likely
to duplicate efforts and waste resources.
There are many measures that look at the similarity of roles in a network.
Structural equivalence indicates that different actors share a jointly occupied position in
the network. For example, if actor A and actor B both have ties to actor C, they share a
position. The pattern of ties to other actors is emphasized here; it is the similarity of ties
that creates the shared position, not that the actors share the same ties (White et al. 1976).
Actor A could have a tie to an actor that is similar to actor C, and that would still be
regarded as structurally equivalent. In the transnational aid flows network, there was an
interesting breakdown of actors into large clusters of aggregators and channels.
Aggregators collected aid from individuals and from other organizations and passed it on
to channels, which delivered the aid, either themselves or through others in the region. In
the OCHA sitreps network, the cutpoints, or the actors that were major hubs for
information, were the UN, the World Health Organization (WHO), Maldives, Thailand,
Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. The equivalence classes in the nuclear treaty network points
out the danger that many nuclear weapons states are in separate classs. Also, there are
states in these classes that have indigenous nuclear capabilities, either for research, power
generation, or both. Another way to discover structural equivalence is through
hierarchical clustering. For the nuclear contracts network, these hierarchical clusters
show that being different organization types does not hamper certain types of similarity.
For example, Areva is a vertically-integrated organization with contracts from suppliers
and to customers at every stage of the fuel cycle from mining to plant operation. The
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other actors in Areva’s “class” have similar patterns of ties, whether they are state-owned
corporations like Areva or not.
A drawback to social network analysis is that it relies ultimately on quantification
and is a crude measure for dealing with unquantifiable nuance or the rich contextual
detail of more qualitative studies. However, SNA is suitable for getting “the big picture,”
or persistent patterns of behavior within the contemporary world order. Furthermore,
using the language and methods of social network analysis allows researchers to enter
into a genuine dialogue with other disciplines that deal with networks of interactions such
as mathematics, physics, and biology. For example, it may be possible to re-create
missing data about relationships in a network through Bayesian analysis. Recent research
in biology used Bayesian network analysis to predict the number and location of links in
a cellular network, which was then tested against what is known about that network from
independent research. The study found that their network analysis was highly successful
in predicting links from limited amounts of information (Sachs et al. 2005).
Intersectionality
The concept of intersectionality first surfaced in critical theory, and was best
explained by Kimberle Crenshaw in a study on the effects of different types of violence
on women of color. She found that the narratives that describe, explain, and circumscribe
race and gender are coded—“blacks” are male in the mainstream narratives, while
“females” are white. Intersectionality refers to the properties exhibited by actors that
belong to racial and gender identity groups that are narratively treated as being mutually
exclusive. This could have disastrous effects on policy choices, preventing women of
color for reporting violence, for preventing violence, and from accessing services for
domestic violence victims. “Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of
real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And so, when the
practices expound identity as woman or person of color as an either/or proposition, they
relegate the identity of women of color to a location that resists telling” (Crenshaw 1991).
In other words, actors belonging to multiple networks (as measured by their different
relationships) can be expected to have different identities, to face different structural
opportunities and constraints, and to pursue different interests.
Feminists have recognized a “need for understanding complexities posed by
intersections of different axis of differentiation.” Intersectionality thus signifies “the
complex, irreducible, varied, and variable effects which ensue when multiple axis of
differentiation – economic, political, cultural, psychic, subjective and experiential –
intersect in historically specific contexts. The concept emphasizes that different
dimensions of social life cannot be separated out into discrete and pure strands”(Brah and
Phoenix 2004). Actors at intersections do not experience identity as additive—black +
female = black female—they experience identity in unique ways, often in opposition to
the mainstream narrative.
Intersectionality is therefore a complex and fluid concept, difficult to
operationalize, and even more difficult to quantify—unless we marry network analysis to
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mathematics: membership in a network is a dimension of identity (whether for individual
or collective actors), and again, the networks themselves can be considered cells or
subsets of a set or hypergraph. Thus, the intersection of two sets A and B is the set that
contains all elements of A that also belong to B (or equivalently, all elements of B that
also belong to A), but no other elements.
To find the intersection of the four networks discussed here, the software program
ORA (Carley 2010) yielded some interesting results: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, India, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States were the members of this class appearing in all four networks. All are states; there
are no nonstate actors in the group. While realists might point out that this would be their
expected result anyway, it is an important result because the intersection does not depend
on a priori definitions of actors but on the relations in which these actors are active. As a
result, it could change in the future—indeed, one could argue that within the United
Nations family there are treaty-based non-proliferation organizations, so the United
Nations should also be included in the intersection and that it was not is a mere artefact of
coding.
Furthermore, the focus on multiple relations or layers means that the actors in the
intersection are not just features in the network surface topography, but are prominent in
the networks’ geology. It comes as no surprise that the highly developed states of
Western Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan are active in the provision of
security in many frames and relations. However, the intersection also indicates that there
are newcomers to this club such as India. There are also notable no-shows, such as
China, Brazil, and Russia.
There are several possible uses for intersections. This would be useful for
“profiling,” or to ask a specific question of multiple networks (i.e., how many actors fit a
specific profile). It could be used to find a core of actors in multiple networks. This
would be useful in global economic governance in taking the economy’s “temperature” in
testing the network positions of companies in different industries, if one has reliable
transaction data (Germain 2007, Setser 2008, Bernanke 2008). For example, the
definition of “too big to fail” might be those actors with high centrality measures at the
intersection of multiple networks as measured by relation type. A banking relationship
such as Countrywide Financial Corp. and American International Group Inc. that is at the
center of both mortgage lending and offering securitized debt as an investment is a case
in point (This American Life 2008, Center for Public Integrity 2009). And it could be
used to test for change over time by looking at the same network at multiple points in
time (i.e., asking is there a stable group of core actors). It should be emphasized that the
use of intersections should be as a test for further study—it is a quick method to see if
further study is warranted.
Network Strategies Depend on the Framework
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Network analysis is a tool for assessing systemic risk, and regulating accordingly.
Instead of focusing on the type of actor when developing legislation or other types of
regulation, regulators should focus on the relationships among them—that is, they should
use network analysis in crafting their rules and regulations. For example, all the actors in
finance are connected by each trade or other financial transaction they make; among
banks, mortgage companies, credit unions, and so on, every transaction is a relationship.
All of these relationships together make a network. If we look at a specific type of
transaction using social network analysis, we should see how financial actors are wired
together.
The problem of security and stability in global financial networks is not simply
one of sheer size, but that some of these actors will be more central than others. There are
many measures of centrality—some actors will have more interactions, or will have ties
to more partners, or will closely connect such actors without being as active in trading
themselves (Wasserman and Faust 1994). For example, “degree centrality” simply
measures the number of ties an actor has. If the relationship is directed, as in the flow of
money from one actor to another, we can also speak of in-degrees and out-degrees, and in
the case of money, the relationship is also valued. Even just using this one measure, we
can examine the network to see which actors are dealing with each other, how much that
trade is worth, and in which direction the exchange is flowing.
Network density and flexibility is critically important when context is a deciding
factor: culture and geography. High measures of density and low flexibility in terms of
joining/leaving the network are desirable when enforcement is self-administered and
where the threat is of long standing, as in the case of nuclear nonproliferation. In this
case, allowing states to exit the system of nonproliferation treaties should be discouraged
as much as possible. Similarly, nuclear states should be incorporated into the system.
Slow-moving threats such as this require more consensus and therefore more
institutionalization, so the aim should be to make the network as dense as possible.
Density is less important while flexibility is more so when the actors must
cooperate quickly but not permanently in vastly different regions with different needs, as
in the case of the tsunami. If you need to respond to a fast-moving threat, you need both
a “backbone” of trusted actors that know how to work well together (even if they do not
work together all the time or even regularly), and the ability to scale up quickly by
accepting or creating ties to other actors.
Actors in global politics may also occupy different roles within networks such as
cutpoint and broker, actors that connect otherwise unrelated clusters of individuals.
Removal of these nodes splits the network into two separate networks that do not interact
with each other. The number and the value of these relationships may not look especially
significant to the network, but these nodes play important parts in passing on the effects
of shocks such as contagion and bankruptcy.
Toward a Future Research Agenda

16

We obviously are at an early stage, and capturing global governance data will be
problematic until social scientists become more aware of the abundance of data inherent
in the increasingly digitized records of movements and transactions by actors of every
stripe. The possibilities of finding or recording digitized data, and using it to examine
interaction patterns will grow. Meaningful global governance data is available if we have
better theory to guide us. For instance, it would be useful to imagine a laser’s sending a
sheet of light through a cloud of smoke as it swirls in a current. Many slices will be
required just to approach a three-dimensional model of the cloud, and we require the
fourth dimension of time to show air currents. We cannot merely examine one network at
one point in time—not only do we need lots of slices, but we need to see them in proper
sequence. We require better pictures, or thick descriptions, of both constituent actors and
processes.
Global governance has been a difficult concept to grasp because its manifestations
sometimes seem inconsistent. Imploding states and the European Union are part of
contemporary reality, which reflect James Rosenau’s “fragmegration” (Rosenau 1997).
Keeping in mind simultaneously what seem like inconsistencies is a perceptual problem
and not an indicator that global governance cannot be understood or made to work better.
Without adequate depictions of what is going on, policy prescriptions are elusive—hence,
simultaneous calls for more robust multilateralism as well as for stronger states. If we
look at sovereignty as an anomaly—or a cancer metastasizing in various directions and
preventing common solutions—we need tools for diagnosis and prognosis before we can
apply the correct drugs or surgery. In any case, far more robust and diverse international
institutions are bound to be part of the mix.
It is ironic that cooperation in extreme security situations such as the tsunami and
nuclear nonproliferation appears to be much more effective than it is in situations far
more likely to occur, more likely to affect more people, and more likely to threaten the
state, such as the cooperation required to assure global financial stability. Further
research should investigate the possibility that governing global common pool resources
such as security is easier at the extremes.
At this time, it is impossible to use global governance theory to predict global
system change or system-wide conflict, but that does not distinguish it from other bodies
of theory. To continue the medical analogy, it would be like trying to predict multiple
organ failure. I suspect that as global governance theory develops and our understanding
improves, we may be able to use this framework to foresee just these kinds of changes
within the world system. Slices would show us structural positions, and slices over time
could show patterns of change. For example, the structure could show which states are
becoming weaker relative to other actors. Their situations could then be investigated
more closely to uncover the possible reasons, which could be compared to actors with
similar structural patterns elsewhere in the system. As one group of analysts writes,
“Finding local fluidity and global stability…suggests that change moves through
structurally equivalent actors” (Moody et al. 2005).
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Better information could also be used to calculate probabilities; for instance that a
structure exhibiting certain characteristics is likely to change in predictable ways.
Network statistical applications could be particularly useful, especially in modeling the
cooperation between individual actors in the framework of dynamic or evolutionary game
theory. Absolute predictability is impossible because all subsequent conditions are
explained partially by previous ones and partially by chance. In spite of this randomness,
global governance is about numerous actors’ self-organizing through formal and informal
means to meet worldwide challenges.
Conclusion
Many observers attribute a normative aspect to global governance: i.e., it should
be this, it should achieve that. I would argue that it is early days yet, and we don’t know
enough about what is happening to make judgments about the directions in which we
want to move. For example, should global institutions be more democratic or more
efficient? And how should they be designed—around the relationship or around the type
of actor? The purpose of using SNA to model global governance is to create a road map
so we can decide where we want to go.
The study of structure, or the paths and processes of interactions, is essential to
the study of agency, which is why as IR analysts we should move from being slicers of
cheese to MRI technicians. University of Chicago historian and philosopher of theory
development William Sewell theorized that dynamic structures are produced, reproduced,
and transformed by human agency (Sewell 1992). His approach works equally well in
history, sociology, and political science. In this vein, I seek to describe, explain, and
predict politics at the global level in ways that are comprehensible to others. Our task
then is to create a qualitative model of global governance that can identify the most
important processes by which human beings can exercise their agency, regaining control
over themselves and the globe’s destiny.
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